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NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -

First Amendment -

A

Newspaper Cannot Constitutionally Be Compelled to
Publish a Paid Advertisement Designed to Be an
Editorial Response to Previous Newspaper Reports.
Wisconsin Association of Nursing Homes, Inc. v. Journal Co., 92 Wis. 2d 709, 285 N.W.2d 891 (Ct. App.
1979).
In Wisconsin Association of Nursing Homes, Inc. v.
Journal Co.,1 the Wisconsin Court of Appeals had the opportunity to pass on a question previously undecided in written
opinions in this state. The court, following the rationale of the
United States Supreme Court in Miami Herald Publishing
Co. v. Tornillo,2 held that a newspaper could not be compelled
to publish a paid advertisement which was designed to be an
editorial response to previous newspaper reports. In an area
which has provoked considerable comment, 3 the court of appeals declined to accept the position of those who believe
access to the press should be made available. Instead, the
court relied on a traditional first amendment analysis4 to
uphold the privilege of the paper to refuse to print
advertisements.
On October 16, 1977, the Milwaukee Journalbegan a fivepart series of investigative reports which dealt with the quality of care and services in several area nursing homes.5 The
Wisconsin Association of Nursing Homes, Inc., along with several individual nursing homes,8 prepared an editorial reply to
1. 92 Wis. 2d 709, 285 N.W.2d 891 (Ct. App. 1979).
2. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
3. See generally Barron, Access to the Press - A New First Amendment Right,
80 HARv. L. REv. 1641 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Barron]; Lange, The Role of the
Access Doctrine in the Regulation of the Mass Media: A CriticalReview and Assessment, 52 N.C.L. REv. 1 (1973); Chatzky & Robinson, A ConstitutionalRight of Access to Newspapers: Is There Life After Tornillo?, 16 SANTA CLARA L. ReV. 453
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Chatzky & Robinson].
4. "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press." U.S. CONsT. amend. I. For an interpretation, see L. TRme, AiEmcAN CONsTnTtIONAL LAW §§ 12-22 (1978) [hereinafter cited as TRIBE].
5. The articles, written by Neil D. Rosenberg and Richard L. Kenyon, were critical of the state's enforcement of nursing home regulations.
6. The nursing homes which were named plaintiffs in the action were: Elm Park
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the allegations which appeared in the Journal series. The reply was submitted to the Journal in the form of a full-page
advertisement for which nursing homes would pay the standard advertising rate. The Journal refused to print the advertisement in the form submitted, contending that portions
of the ad were potentially libelous.8 Undaunted, the nursing
homes resubmitted the same ad, which was again rejected. Finally, they commenced an action seeking a court order compelling publication of the proffered advertisement.
The defendant newspaper moved to dismiss for failure to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted pursuant to
section 802.06(2)(f) of the Wisconsin Statutes. The circuit
court granted the motion to dismiss on the merits and entered
an order for judgment dismissing the complaint with costs to
the defendant. The plaintiffs were not given leave to replead.9
The plaintiffs appealed the lower court decision to the court
of appeals, and the court affirmed. In short, it held that a
"court can no more dictate what a privately owned newspaper
can print than what it cannot print."' 0
Iowa, Inc., Muskego Nursing Homes, Inc., and Underwood Nursing Home, Inc. These
nursing homes were part of the focus of the Journal'sseries.
7. The reply was entitled "An Editorial Reply to the Recent Journal Series on
Nursing Homes." The ad attempted to clarify some of the errors of fact which they
felt were present in the Journalseries. See Brief for Appellees at Exhibit B.
8.Brief for Appellees at 17-18 states:
In paragraph numbered I of their ad plaintiff criticized 'A few Milwaukee area
surveyors who, by incompetence (at best), by design (most likely), or by vindictiveness (at worst) have misapplied, misinterpreted or invented rules and regulations to harass some nursing homes.. . .' That alone may have identified no
one, but in the next column, after referring to 'good surveyors' the ad contains
another passage which refers to a specific supervisory office: 'other surveyors,
(and there appears to be an over-abundance of them in the West Allis office),
saw this policy as an opportunity to "get at" some nursing home administrators. . .

.'

That reference may well have furnished the necessary identification,

of people in a particular office [to establish defamation or libel]....
9. The decision not to allow the plaintiff to replead is within the discretion of the
trial courL Exercise of this discretion is not favored, and permission to replead is
refused only where there are no circumstances under which the plaintiff could plead
any cause of action. See Wilson v. Continental Ins. Co., 87 Wis. 2d 310, 317, 274
N.W.2d 679, 683 (1979); Morgan v. Pennsylvania Gen. Ins. Co., 87 Wis. 2d 723, 732,
275 N.W.2d 660, 664 (1979).
10. 92 Wis. 2d at 713, 285 N.W.2d at 894, citing Carpets by the Carload, Inc. v.
Warren, 368 F. Supp. 1075, 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1973); Associates & Aldrich Co. v. Times
Mirror Co., 440 F.2d 133, 135 (9th Cir. 1971); Chicago Joint Bd., Arnal. Cloth. Wkrs.
v. Chicago Tribune Co., 435 F.2d 470 (7th Cir. 1970); Avins v. Rutgers, State Univ. of
N.J., 385 F.2d 151 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 920 (1968); Modla v. Tribune

1980]

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

I. MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS
The underlying rationale of judicial decisions concerning
access to the press was first expressed by Justice Holmes in
his dissent in Abrams v. United States. He stated that "the
best test of truth is the power of thought to get itself accepted
in the competition of the market....

That, at any rate, is

' It is for this reason that
the theory of our Constitution."11
freedom of the press has been construed to be freedom of the
press from governmental interference.12
Today, however, the newspaper industry has been marked
by increased concentration of ownership and control resulting
in dwindling competition."8 This lack of competition was
spurred by the Newspaper Preservation Act of 1970,", which
exempted certain specified joint newspaper operating arrangements from federal antitrust laws. Congress apparently recognized that in order to preserve editorial diversity, some monopolization would have to be tolerated. 5
The function of a newspaper has shifted from providing
for the communication and dissemination of ideas, which
Alexis de Tocqueville recognized as the strength of the American press, 16 to an emphasis on marketing and advertising. The
size of the market rather than the quality of the content of a
newspaper is the crucial determinant of whether a newspaper
shall prosper or shall fail. 17
Because of this change of purpose, the marketplace of
ideas theory is less valid today.' 8 Professor Jerome Barron
thinks that a clinging to this marketplace of ideas theory for

Publishing Co., 14 Ariz. App. 82, 480 P.2d 999 (1971). See also Person v. New York
Post Corp., 427 F. Supp. 1297, 1301 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
11. 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., joined by Brandeis, J., dissenting).
12. See cases cited in note 10 supra. See also Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d 1286 (1968).
13. Chatzky & Robinson, supra note 3, at 458. For discussions of media concentration, see Bennett, Media Concentration and the FCC: Focusing with a Section
Seven Lens, 66 Nw. U.L. REv. 159, 179-86 (1971); Johnson & Houck, Media Concentration:Some Observations on the United States' Experience, 56 IowA L. REv. 267,
269 (1970); Comment, "Cross-Media" Ownership and the Antitrust Laws - A Critical Analysis and a Suggested Solution, 47 N.C.L. REv. 794, 802-05 (1969).
14. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1801-04 (1970); see also Chatzky & Robinson, supra note 3.
15. H.R. REP. No. 91-1193, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reported in 2 U.S. CODE
CONG. & An. NEWS 3547.
16. A. DE TOCQuEVILLE, 1 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 185-88 (P. Bradley ed. 1945).
17. Barnet & Muller, Global Reach 232 (1974).
18. Barron, supra note 3, at 1648.
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newspapers has resulted in an anomaly in our analysis of the
first amendment. In protecting the freedom of newspapers to
determine their own content, he feels that their public nature
has been ignored. Access to the media has been restricted in
order to protect media content. "While we protect expression
once it has come to the fore, our law is indifferent to creating
opportunities for expression. "' 1 While the courts, and even
2 0 have recognized the importance of a
the Milwaukee Journal,
right of access to public forums, there has been a general unwillingness to extend this public forum analysis to
newspapers.2 1
II.

A NEWSPAPER'S RIGHT TO REJECT ADVERTISEMENTS

In most instances the courts have held that a privately
owned newspaper may reject whatever advertisements it
chooses not to publish, regardless of the reasons.22 This was
the holding of the United States Supreme Court in Miami
Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo.2 s In Tornillo, the Court
held unconstitutional a Florida right-of-reply statute which
granted a political candidate equal space to answer a newspaper's criticism and attacks of his record.2 In rejecting the
statute, the Court thoroughly reviewed the vast wealth of

19. Id. at 1641.
20. Milwaukee Journal, June 16, 1980, at 1, col. 1. In a front-page editorial the
Journal criticized court decisions and shopping center owners who contended that
"property rights took precedence over the free speech rights of citizens who wanted
to use the malls as public forums." The editorial went on to compare the shopping
malls to town squares since both sponsored public events to attract customers. Unfortunately, the Journaldid not accept the view that a similar standard should be applied to newspapers. It has instead used the cloak of free press and free speech to
shield itself to avoid certain opinions instead of acting as a sounding board for their
expression. Cf. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) ("Freedom of
the press from governmental interference under the First Amendment does not sanction repression of that freedom by private interests.").
21. In PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 100 S. Ct. 2035, 2044 (1980), the
Supreme Court once again distinguished the protections afforded the news media to
limit access from the ability of a shopping center owner to prohibit the distribution of
handbills. Relying on Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974),
the Court noted that there is an important constitutional distinction between shopping center owners and newspaper editors. To extend the shopping center analysis to
newspapers is inapposite.
22. See cases cited in note 10 supra. See also Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d 1286 (1968).
23. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
24. Id. at 243.
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literature which advocated an enforceable right of access to
the press. 25 However, the Court rejected this access argument,
holding that government-enforced access conflicted with the
express provisions of the first amendment.2 6 The Court held:
A newspaper is more than a passive receptacle or conduit for
news, comment, and advertising. The choice of material to
go into a newspaper, and the decisions made as to limitations on the size and content of the paper, and treatment of
public issues and public officials-whether fair or unfair-constitute the exercise of editorial control and judgment. It has yet to be demonstrated how governmental regulation of this crucial process can be exercised consistent with
First Amendment guarantees
of a free press as they have
2
evolved to this time. 7

Even court decisions which have appeared to intrude upon
the editorial discretion of a newspaper have been quick to
limit the extent of governmental interference with the editorial process.2s In Associated Press v. United States,29 the Supreme Court affirmed a district court decision"° enjoining the
Associated Press from forbidding its members to pass information along to nonmembers. This attempted action by the
Associated Press was considered a violation of freedom of the
press guarantees. While the case represents an instance where
governmental interference with the press was approved, the
underlying assumption remains the same as in cases preventing interference. That is, absent a combination in restraint of
another's ability to publish, the free flow of ideas will flourish.
Justice Black's opinion notes:
[The first] amendment rests on the assumption that the

widest possible dissemination of information from diverse
and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the
public, that a free press is a condition of a free society.
Surely a command that the government itself shall not im-

pede the free flow of ideas does not afford non-governmental
25. Id. at 248-57.
26. Id. at 254.
27. Id. at 258 (footnote omitted).
28. See generally Pittsburgh Press v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 276
(1973).
29. 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
30. 52 F. Supp. 362 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
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combinations of a refuge if they impose restraints upon that
constitutionally guaranteed freedom.... Freedom to publish is guaranteed by the Constitution, but freedom to combine to keep others from publishing is not. Freedom of the
press from governmental interference under the First
Amendment does not sanction the repression of that freedom by private interests.3 1
In a footnote to this quotation, the Court emphasized that its
decision did not compel the Associated Press or its members
to permit publication of anything which their reason tells
them should not be published.2 Government intrusion, when
it has been sanctioned, has always been severely limited.3 3
In Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Commission,3 4 the Supreme Court upheld a bar against unemployment advertising which specified "male" or "female" preferences. In a limited sense, the Court's decision in Pittsburgh
Press may be viewed as standing for the proposition that governmental compulsion may be brought to bear upon editorial
decisions. However, the Court carefully limited its decision to
the particular facts of the case presented. The case involved
purely commercial speech and the existence of a legitimate
countervailing public interest in ending employment discrimination against women.3 5 The Court emphasized the limit of its
holding by saying:
[N]othing in our holding allows government at any level to
forbid Pittsburgh Press to publish and distribute advertisements commenting on the Ordinance, the enforcement practices of the Commission, or the propriety of sex preference
in employment. Nor, a fortiori, does our decision authorize
any restriction whatever, whether of content or layout, on
stories or commentary originated by Pittsburgh Press, its
columnists, or its contributors. On the contrary, we reaffirm
unequivocally the protection afforded to editorial judgment
and to the free expression of views on these and other issues,
however controversial. We hold only that the Commission's
31. 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
32. Id. at 20 n.18.
33. BoUinger, Freedom of the Press and Public Access: Toward a Theory of Partial Regulation of the Mass Media, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1, 3 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Bollinger]; 2 Z. CHAx-E, GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS 477 (1947).
34. 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
35. Id. at 391. See also Chatzky & Robinson, supra note 3, at 476.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

modified order, narrowly drawn to prohibit placement in
sex-designated columns of advertisements for nonexempt
job opportunities, does not infringe the First Amendment
rights of Pittsburgh Press.8 6
Even this limitation caused concern among some of the Justices. This concern was reflected in the dissenting opinion by
Justices Stewart and Douglas, who believed: "[the] question,
to put it simply, is whether any government agency-local,
state or federal-can tell a newspaper in advance what it can
print and what it cannot." 87
III.

RIGHT OF ACCESS IN OTHER MEDIA

While the courts have consistently rejected a right of access to privately owned newspapers, decisions concerning
other media are less clear.sa In Red Lion BroadcastingCo. v.
FCC,9 the Supreme Court upheld an FCC rule requiring radio stations to provide free reply time for political candidates
and victims of personal attack.4 0 The FCC rulings involved in
Red Lion were similar in nature to the Florida right-of-reply
statute involved in Tornillo.4 1 Yet, Tornillo makes no mention
of the Red Lion case. Similarly, Red Lion was ignored by the
Wisconsin Court of Appeals in its decision in Wisconsin Association of Nursing Homes. 2
In sanctioning the fairness doctrine, the Supreme Court
premised its decision on the physical limitations of the electromagnetic spectrum. By doing this, the Court allowed in the
broadcast media what it specifically disallowed in the print
medium. It sanctioned governmental interference that reduced the freedom of a broadcaster to select the ideas which
he will disseminate. This approach has been defended by Professor Posner although it is not clear that such an approach is
warranted:

36. 413 U.S. 376, 391 (1973).
37. Id. at 400 (Stewart, J., joined by Douglas, J., dissenting).
38. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAw 308 (1972) [hereinafter cited
as POSNER]; Bollinger, supra note 33, at 1.
39. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
40. Id. at 389.
41. See Bollinger, supra note 33, at 5; Chatzky & Robinson, supra note 3, at 466.
Compare FLA. STAT. § 104.38 (1973) with 47 C.F.R. § 73.123 (1973).
42. 92 Wis. 2d 709, 285 N.W.2d 891 (Ct.App. 1979).
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[B]roadcasters, unlike newspaper owners, enjoy a monopoly
position in the dissemination of ideas due to the limited capacity of the electromagnetic spectrum to support competing broadcasters in the same community. Since two broadcasters could not broadcast on the same frequency in the
same area without creating intolerable interference, the
award by the Federal Communications Commission of a license to use a particular frequency in a particular area confers a monopoly of that frequency that has no counterpart in
other media of expression.4"
In Columbia BroadcastingSystem, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee,44 the Supreme Court retreated somewhat
from its earlier position in Red Lion. The Court held that the
fairness doctrine did not require a broadcaster to show a paid
editorial advertisement in every case. Chief Justice Burger,
speaking for a plurality of the Court, stated: "The broadcaster

* is allowed significant journalistic discretion in deciding
how best to fulifill the Fairness Doctrine obligations, although
that discretion is bounded by rules designed
to assure that the
'45
public interest in fairness is furthered.
The Court employed a balancing test of sorts between the
right of the public in general to know and the right of the
public which seeks access to the media to be heard.40 The
power of the government to interfere is subject to the prior

exercise of journalistic discretion. Governmental interference
is limited to those instances in which an adequate forum for
the expression of competing sides has not been provided. 7
Even this appears to go beyond the scope of governmental

43. PosNER, supra note 38, at 312.
44. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
45. Id. at 111 (footnotes omitted).
46. TRIBE, supra note 4, at 699. See also Bollinger, supra note 32, at 10-11.
47. The decision in Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm.,
412 U.S. 94 (1973), has been interpreted as a limitation on prior restraint which can
be exercised by the government. For the government to act, it would have to appear
that an insufficient forum was given to a minority opinion or view. For a fuller discussion of the case, see, e.g., Barrow, The Fairness Doctrine: A Double Standard for
Electronic and Print Media, 26 HAsT. L.J. 659 (1975); The Supreme Court, 1972
Term, 87 HARv. L. REV. 57, 175 (1973); Comment, Right of Access to Broadcasting:
The Supreme Court Takes a Dim View, 62 GEo. L.J. 355 (1973); Comment, Lin'ited
Access to Purchase Public Issue Advertising Time, 27 RUTGERS L. REv. 738 (1974);
Comment, The Regulation of Competing First Amendment Rights: A New Fairness
Doctrine Balance After CBS? 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1238 (1974).

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

1980]

interference which has been allowed for privately owned
newspapers."8
The different classifications into which the courts have
placed the broadcast and newspaper media appear unwarranted.49 The economic limitations which exist in one branch
of the media exist with equal force in the other.50 The purpose
of the first amendment is to ensure communication."1 Ifthere
is a "profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wideopen," 2 then the rationale which requires governmental interference to ensure public access to the broadcast media would
seem to apply with equal force to the newspaper media.58
However, any regulation on access to the press by definition
will restrict freedom of the press, a consequence that few wish
to see."'
IV.

NEWSPAPERS AS QUASI-PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS
Wisconsin Association of Nursing Homes,5" the

In
plaintiffs attempted to argue that the Journal's position as the
only major daily afternoon newspaper in the City of Milwaukee made it a quasi-public institution, subject to a special obligation to print both sides of an issue.56 In rejecting this argument, the court relied on Chicago Joint Board, Amalgamated
Clothing Workers of America v. Chicago Tribune Co. 57 In
that case the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals rejected a labor union's attempt to compel a newspaper to publish an edi48. See, e.g., Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
49. It is difficult to reconcile the different approaches which the Court has taken
regarding the two types of media. Professor Bollinger argues that the distinctions are
misplaced considering the present economic similarities between the two media. Curiously, the scarcity of newspapers has not prompted the same concern which exists for
the scarcity of broadcast airwaves. See Bollinger, supra note 33. See, e.g., National
Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943). The continued validity of the
scarcity doctrine is questionable, however, given the unlimited number of broadcasts
potentially available due to cable television.
50. But see POSNER, supra note 38, at 312.
51. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
52. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
53. Chatzky & Robinson, supra note 3, at 463.
54. See Bollinger, supra note 33, for a discussion of the problems attendant to
any formulation which would restrict editorial discretion.
55. 92 Wis. 2d 709, 285 N.W.2d 891 (Ct.App. 1979).
56. Id. at 715, 285 N.W.2d at 895; Brief for Appellants at 18.
57. 435 F.2d 470 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 973 (1970).
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torial advertisement. The union had launched a campaign
which was designed to limit the importation of foreign-made
clothing into the United States. Marshall Field was a large retailer of imported clothing, and it advertised these goods in
the defendant's newspaper. To counteract these advertisements, the union wanted to place its own counter-advertisement concerning its position in the Chicago Tribune. The
court rejected the argument that the newspaper was a public
facility required to print the proffered advertisement.5 8 The
court stated:
It is urged that the privilege of First Amendment protection
afforded a newspaper carries with it a reciprocal obligation
to serve as a public forum, and if a newspaper accepts any
editorial advertising it must publish all lawful editorial advertisements tendered to it for publication at its established
rates. We do not understand this to be the concept of freedom of the press recognized in the First Amendment. The
First Amendment guarantees of free expression, oral or
printed, exist for all.... The Union's right to free speech

does not give it the right to make use of the defendants'
printing presses and distribution systems without defendants' consent.5
Closely linked to the nursing homes' claim that the Journal is a quasi-public institution is the argument that newspapers have a duty to provide reasonable space for citizens to
express their views. This is because newspapers exercise monopoly control over an area of vital public concern. Such a
contention was raised in Resident Participationof Denver,
Inc. v. Love, 60 and was similarly dismissed. As the court in
Wisconsin Association of Nursing Homes noted, the conducting of a newspaper business involves no state action.6 1
Quoting from Chicago Joint Board, Amalgamated Clothing
Workers of America v. Chicago Tribune Co., the court stated:
Rather than regarded as an extension of the state exercising delegated powers of a governmental nature, the press
has long and consistently been recognized as an independant
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 474.
Id. at 478.
322 F. Supp. 1100 (D. Colo. 1971).
92 Wis. 2d at 717, 285 N.W.2d at 896.
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[sic] check on governmental power....
In sum, the function of the press from the days the Constitution was written to the present time has never been
conceived as anything but a private enterprise, free and in-

dependent of government control and supervision. Rather
than state power and participation pervading the operation
and the government have had a
of the press, the news media
2

history of disassociation.

Even where state action has been shown to be present, as
in an official publication of a state-supported university, the
courts have held that there still exists the freedom to exercise
subjective editorial discretion in rejecting a proffered article:
The right to freedom of speech does not open every avenue
to one who desires to use a particular outlet for expression.
On the contrary, each particular avenue for expression
presents its own peculiar problems....

Thus, one who claims that his constitutional right to
freedom of speech has been abridged must show that he has
a right to use the particular medium through which he seeks
to speak. . . . [T]he acceptance or rejection of articles submitted for publication in a law school law review necessarily
involves the exercise of editorial judgment and this is in no
wise lessened by the fact that the law review is supported, at
least in part by the State."3
V.

NEWSPAPER REJECTION OF ADS AND RESTRAINTS OF
TRADE

While the Nursing Home Association expressly denied that
62. 92 Wis. 2d at 717, 285 N.W.2d at 896, quoting the Seventh Circuit's quotation,
in Chicago Joint Bd., Amal. Cloth. Workers v. Chicago Tribune Co., 435 F.2d 470,474
(7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 973 (1970), of the district court's memorandum
opinion. Compare with Uhlman v. Sherman, 22 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 255, 31 Ohio Dec. 54
(1919), where the court held that newspapers are clothed with a public interest and as
such should be subject to regulation. However, a later court, faced with the same
issue, rejected Uhlman, stating that Uhlman "should be followed unless it clearly
appears to this court that the decision is wrong - which is the case." Sky High Theatre, Inc. v. Gauner Publishing Co. (Champagne Co. C.P.N. 22820), quoted in Bloss v.
Federated Publications, Inc., 5 Mich. App. 74, 83, 145 N.W.2d 800, 804 (1966).
63. Avins v. Rutgers, State Univ. of N.J., 385 F.2d 151, 153 (3d Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 920 (1968). See also Mississippi Gay Alliance v. Goudelock, 536 F.2d
1073, 1075 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 982 (1977). Cf. Kissinger v. New
York City Transit Auth., 274 F. Supp. 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Lee v. Board of Regents,
306 F. Supp. 1097 (W.D. Wis. 1969), a/t'd, 441 F.2d 1257 (7th Cir. 1971); Fitzgerald v.
National Rifle Ass'n of America, 383 F. Supp. 162 (D.N.J. 1974).
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the Journalhad acted in restraint of trade in rejecting its editorial advertisement,6 its position on this issue was confused
by the inclusion in its pleadings of allegations concerning the
Journal'smonopoly position in Milwaukee. 5 While the plaintiffs here were unsuccessful in pleading an antitrust violation,
such violations have been held to require access to the media.66 However, the mere fact that a newspaper is the only
newspaper, or the largest newspaper, in an area is immaterial
in establishing a violation of antitrust laws.6
In Lorain Journal Co. v. United States"' the Supreme
Court upheld an injunction restraining a publisher under the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act from refusing to accept local advertising from customers who also advertised with the competing
radio station. The Court found that this injunction did not
violate the freedom of the press as a prior restraint upon what
it might publish. 9 The Lorain Journal was the only daily local newspaper in the City of Lorain, Ohio. For this reason it
enjoyed a substantial monopoly over local news and advertising. A radio station was licensed nearby, and the newspaper
refused to accept any local advertising from customers who
also advertised with the radio station. The purpose of the
practice was to drive the competing radio station out of business. The Supreme Court held that these types of predatory
practices forced advertisers to boycott a competing radio station and violated applicable antitrust laws.70 The Court's

holding is limited to those instances in which advertisers can
show that the rejection of a proffered advertisement was in
furtherance of an attempt to monopolize trade.
Similarly, in Kansas City Star Co. v. United States,7 1 the
64. 92 Wis. 2d at 721 n.2, 285 N.W.2d at 898 n.2.
65. See Brief for Appellants at 7-9; Brief for Respondents at 22-26. The bare assertion by the Wisconsin Association of Nursing Homes that the newspaper is a monopoly is insufficient to state a cause of action. Some predatory action must be specifically pleaded. Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
66. See text accompanying notes 68-72 infra.
67. Associates & Aldrich Co. v. Times Mirror Co., 440 F.2d 133 (9th Cir. 1971);
Bloss v. Federated Publications, Inc., 380 Mich. 485, 157 N.W.2d 241 (1968); Carpets
by the Carload, Inc. v. Warren, 368 F. Supp. 1075 (E.D. Wis. 1973).
68. 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
69. Id. at 155.
70. Id. at 152. The newspapers' acts violated § 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.
71. 240 F.2d 643 (8th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 923 (1957).
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Kansas City Star threatened to refuse ads from advertisers if
they advertised with the Star's competitors. Since these were
predatory acts aimed at the newspaper's advertising competitors, they were likewise held to be illegal.
Absent predatory acts, the only restrictions on a newspaper's choice of what to print will be those outlined in the
plurality opinion in Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v.
Democratic National Committee:
The power of a privately owned newspaper to advance its
own political, social, and economic views is bounded by only
two factors: first, the acceptance of a sufficient number of
readers - and hence advertisers -

to assure financial suc-

cess; and, second,
the journalistic integrity of its editors and
7
publishers.

3

To place such enduring trust in the journalistic integrity of
newspapers, whose first order of business is necessarily to sell
copies, creates the potential for significant economic conflicts
of interest.74 The large economies of scale7" which are necessary to establish a newspaper have seriously limited the number of outlets for expression. No longer is it true that "It]he
facility with which newspapers can be established produces a
multitude of them. '7 6 The court of appeals in Wisconsin Association of Nursing Homes, Inc. v. Journal Co. 7 7 fails to ad-

just to this present-day economic concentration in the newspaper industry, 8 leaving newspapers practically immune,"'
72. Cf. Approved Personnel v. Tribune Co., 177 So.2d 704 (Fla. App. 1965).
(While the court found no predatory acts, it seemed to imply that a statutory limitation might be placed on the editorial discretion of a newspaper which enjoyed a
monopoly).
73. 412 U.S. 94, 117 (1973).
74. Barnet & Muller, Global Reach 232 (1974).
75. Large economies of scale are the large costs needed to start up newspaper
production.
76. A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, 1 DEMoCRACY IN AmmuCA 186 (P. Bradley ed. 1945).

77. 92 Wis. 2d 709, 285 N.W.2d 891 (Ct.App. 1979).
78. Report of the Task Force, The Twentieth Century Fund Task Force Report
for a National News Council, A Free and Responsive Press 4 (1973). See also J.
WIGGINS, FREEDoM on SEcREcY 178 (rev. ed. 1964).

79. As was seen in this case, not only can a newspaper assert a free press guarantee, it can also hide behind libel laws which were originally designed to promote the
dissemination of information. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964); Edwards v. National Audubon Soc'y, 556 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1002 (1977); Glover v. Herald Co., 549 S.W.2d 858 (Mo. 1977), cert. denied,
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and
unresponsive, s° to the public which they are to
serve.perhaps

VI.

CONCLUSION

A court can no more dictate what a privately owned newspaper can print than it can dictate what it cannot print.8 2 No
right of access exists for an advertiser who desires to have a
paid advertisement placed in a newspaper. While the courts
have been somewhat more willing to provide a right of access
to the broadcast media, this right has been subject to
erosion.8s
Furthermore, a newspaper's obligation to provide a means
for the dissemination of public information is not sufficient to
elevate it to the status of a quasi-public institution. Finally,
newspapers have received the benefit of exceptions to antitrust laws which have allowed them to establish a monopoly
position, making it difficult for an advertiser whose ad has
been rejected to seek judicial relief. The court decisions have
failed to eliminate the ironic inconsistency in our constitutional law that allows newspapers actually to restrict the dissemination of ideas under the aegis of freedom of the press.
DONALD W. LAYDEN, JR.

CIVIL PROCEDURE-Jurisdiction-State May Not
Assert Quasi In Rem Jurisdiction Over An Insurance
Company's Contractual Obligations to Defend and
Indemnify Its Insured. Rush v. Savchuh, 444 U.S. 320
434 U.S.. 965 (1977).
80. B. BAGDIKIAN, THE INFORMATION MACHNES 127 (1971). The author notes:
Local monopoly in printed news raises serious questions of diversity of information and opinion. What a local newspaper does not print about local affair
[sic] does not see general print at all. And, having the power to take initiative
in reporting and enunciation of opinions, it has extraordinary power to set the
atmosphere and determine the terms of local consideration of public issues.
81. It is questionable given the newspaper's commitment to its status as a private
corporation whether it is responsive to the public in general or only that public with
adequate resources to obtain access. See Barnet & Muller, Global Reach 230 (1974).
82. 92 Wis. 2d at 713, 285 N.W.2d at 894.
83. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94
(1973).

